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Plan
of Attack by Bob Woodward Rating: ••• (Recommended) |
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Sources I expected
to be disappointed in reading Bob Woodward’s new book, Plan of
Attack. After all, the publicity at the time it was released was
extensive, and I thought I already knew what to expect from all the juicy
revelations in the press. Instead, I found it to be a real page-turner,
thanks to the perspectives Woodward gleaned from more than 75 sources. As a
result, Woodward’s account reads as if he were in each room where decisions
were made. That outcome is as distracting as it is absorbing. After all,
Woodward was not in the room. He uses quotation marks as if what was inside
the quotes was what was actually said, not what was recalled from multiple
sources. Nonetheless, this contribution adds insight not available unless one
is an insider. Here’s an excerpt from chapter
34, pp. 384-392: In “The fate of your nation
hangs on you,” Tim yelled, “and I’m going to pull it all away from you and if
you let me down now, you’re not going to get the seat at the table.” The principal source
phoned in a report cobbled together from what his two subsources
at Dora Farm were telling him: Uday and Qusay were at the farm for sure, and Saddam was expected
back at about 2:30 A.M. or 3 A.M. Iraqi time. The sources on the scene also
reported details about the houses. Additionally there was a manzul on the compound, the report said. Manzul could be translated as “place of
refuge” or “bunker.” Tim chose bunker. The report provided some details about
the “bunker”—distances from the main houses, and its thickness in so many
meters of concrete under so many meters of earth. Tim frantically took this
and sent back to CIA headquarters a flash message summarizing the
information. The president had more
questions. “Is it going to disrupt Tommy’s plan?” he asked. They had spent
over a year on that plan. What would be the impact? Would it blow the whole
element of surprise? The Special Operations Forces that had gone in already
were supposed to be covert. Would this expose them? “Go ask Tommy,” he
directed Rumsfeld. General Myers eventually
reached Franks. “What do you think about
taking a shot at this Dora Farm target?” Myers asked. Franks had been watching
the time-sensitive targets carefully and he had known the night before that
the CIA had been getting closer to Saddam, perhaps at Dora Farm. It looked
like a target for a Tomahawk cruise missile and Franks had ordered the Navy
to program some missiles on the target. “Let the lads work it all night,” he
had said, and then told them they were not going to shoot. It was still during
the 48-hour ultimatum period the president had given Saddam and his sons to
leave. Franks felt pretty strongly, and had counseled Rumsfeld,
that they not take a shot during that period. It was a kind of grace period.
Franks considered it the higher moral ground not to take a shot at someone
who might, improbable as that was, be leaving out the back door. Can you do it in two
hours? Myers next asked. Franks said they could.
The Tomahawks were ready to go. Sometime after 4 P.M.—now past midnight in “They say they’re with
him right now! Both of the sons are there,” Tenet said. Their wives were
there. The families were there also. Saddam was expected back at 2:30 to 3
A.M.—in less than two hours, There was a bunker and one of the ROCKSTARS had
paced off where it was, had gone inside and taken rough measurements. Hadley asked Saul, “Can
you show me where the bunker is?” Saul wasn’t sure, but they took the
overhead photos and Hadley tried to draw a sketch. McLaughlin was soon doing
an improved amateur engineer drawing. Powell was the only
principal missing, and at about 5:15 the president told Rice, “You better
call Cohn.” “Cohn, get to the White
House!” she said, reaching Powell at the State Department. She was abrupt and
offered no explanation. When Powell arrived in a matter of minutes, they
summarized for him. He tried to hang back because it was primarily a military
matter. Soon he was going through the pros and cons—collateral damage,
failure to hit Saddam. “If we’ve got a chance to decapitate them, it’s worth
it,” he finally said. Rumsfeld strongly recommended a strike, and
Cheney agreed though he seemed to be holding back. Bush filled the time with
questions, at one point asking, Were they really sure what they were looking
at was what they thought they were looking at? “It’s as good as it
gets,” Tenet said. “I can’t give you 100 percent assurance, but this is as
good as it gets.” Bush was still worrying
about the women and children. This could be a kind of baby milk factory, he
said, recalling an incident from the 1991 Gulf War when the Iraqis had
claimed a suspected biological weapons plant that was bombed was really for
the production of baby milk. “They would bring out dead women and children,”
Bush said, “and the first pictures would be of civilian casualties on a
massive scale of some kind.” Could Rumsfeld and Myers said it probably didn’t
matter what they hit in the first strike because the Iraqi propaganda machine
was going to say that the That was indeed the
downside. But the others—Cheney, Rumsfeld, Tenet,
even Powell—seemed taken with the upside, a shortcut to victory. Myers raised a serious
problem. If there was a bunker at the Dora compound as they now suspected,
the cruise missiles would not penetrate. They would need the hunker-busting
2,000-pound bombs to get that deep. Myers was sent off to talk to Franks. For a moment, the group weighed the
downsides. They had promised to defend At about 5:40, Cheney
came out for a break and summoned Libby. The vice president explained what
had come in. “It seems like pretty good intelligence, but like all
intelligence, it could be a setup,” Cheney said. “But there is not enough
time to make a full judgment.” Libby went back into the
Oval Office with Cheney. Bush went around the room
and asked, Would you do it? “I would do it, Mr.
President,” Card said. It was too good a chance not to take. Rumsfeld too was strongly in favor. Powell thought it was a
hell of a lot of very specific information that seemed not bad, though it was
a little curious that the CIA sources on the other end of the satellite
phones could have acquired so much. “If we’ve got a chance to
decapitate them, it’s worth it,” Powell recommended again. Rice and Hadley had some
more questions about the sources, but both favored an attack. Myers reached Franks on a
secure phone. Could he load up a stealth fighter with a pair of EGBU-27
bombs, the bunker busters, for the attack? “Absolutely not,” Franks
said. “We don’t have the F-I 17 ready to go.” The F-i
17A Nighthawk, the stealth single-seat fighter jets, typically carried two of
the bombs when fully loaded. Franks checked further.
The Air Force had been following the intelligence and the night before had
readied one F-i 17. The Air Force squadron in Franks asked what the
probability was of a single F- 117 getting through and delivering its pair of
bombs? Though stealthy and radar-evading, the F- 117
would have to go in prior to the suppression of Iraqi air defense, weak as
that was. The plane would be going in cold. The answer came back that the Air
Force could only say there was a 50 percent chance of success. Prepare two bombers,
Franks ordered, figuring that would improve the chances. In Franks sent word to the
Oval Office that it would be possible, but he needed a final decision to go
by about 7:15 P.M. in order to
get the F- 117s in and out of Iraqi airspace well before dawn. Rumsfeld, Myers and CIA men were running in and
out of the Oval Office to find secure phones at West Wing locations. Card was
concerned that the window of opportunity was closing. Did they really
understand the intelligence? Was it necessary to change the weapons? Myers
was trying to find out how long it would take the F- 117s to be loaded, take
off, then fly from “Where is the sun?”
someone asked. When would the sun be coming up in Another question arose.
If it was approved, should the president go on television that night and
make his speech announcing the beginning of the war—a speech now scheduled
for Friday? “Look, this is an ongoing
operation,” Cheney said. “We didn’t announce that the Special Forces were
going in. We didn’t announce the Poles were taking over the platform. We didn’t announce the Australians
were heading toward the dam. We don’t have to announce it yet. You don’t
announce it until you are ready to announce it.” Rumsfeld seemed to half agree. “If someone
should go, maybe it should be me,” he said, but he then added, indicating
Bush, “Or maybe it could be you.” Powell raised the CNN
effect. The attack would be seen instantly. Reporters stationed at
the Rashid Hotel in “If lives are in jeopardy,” the president
said, “I’ve got to go announce it.” Cheney reminded him that
lives were already in danger and there had been no announcement. Should I wait until the
next morning? the president asked. That would
give Franks another 12 hours
before any announcement. Bush called in Karen
Hughes and Dan Bartlett to the Oval Office, He told Saul to sum tip the
intelligence. Then, the president said
he was probably going to order the attack. “How do we do this?” he asked
Hughes and Bartlett. “Do I go on television?” Should he inform the public
before, during or after? Should the secretary of defense do it? Everyone
turned to Hughes. They knew how much Bush relied on her. “No, you need to do it,
Mr. President,” she said. “The American people shouldn’t hear it from the press, they shouldn’t hear it from somebody else. They
should hear it from you. And you should tell them what and why.” If they hit civilians or women and
children, the president had to be ahead
of the curve. She added her trademark observation, “We can’t sort of be catching up.” Powell could not
understand that they would start a war and not get out front with a
presidential announcement. “I promised people I’d
let them know when the war begins,” Bush said. “And if lives—the war is
beginning tonight, lives will be in jeopardy. I have to tell the American
people that I’ve committed American forces to war.” Cheney didn’t seem happy. “They have to hear it
from me,” Bush said. “I’m doing it.” This would be starting the war, he said.
“Let’s not kid ourselves.” At about 6 P.M. Card
called Gerson. “Is it ready?” Card asked. There was
only one speech left to give. “In about five minutes I
can have it ready,” Gerson said. “I want you to meet me
outside the Oval Office at 6:30 with several copies of the speech.” Gerson went down to the Oval Office and sat
in one of the two chairs outside. Card soon emerged. “We’ll
be with you soon enough. Just wait,” he told him. Card took the copies of the
speech, leaving Gerson to cool his heels.
Obviously something was up but Gerson had no idea
what, Tenet and his people were running in and out making secure calls. Inside the Oval Office,
the president went, around the room again, asking if all the principals
agreed, almost pushing each to the wall. They did. Bush turned to Saul.
“Well, what do you think?” Saul’s head was spinning.
He had never been involved in a discussion like this, let alone been asked
his opinion. He was worried about the pilots of the F-1 17s. His intelligence
was now going to put American lives directly at risk, The planes would he
going in with no electronic countermeasures, no fighter escort, no advance suppression of Iraqi air defense. “I have to
apologize that we have to present you with this very tough decision,” Saul
said to the president. “I really feel sorry for you having to make it.’ “Don’t,” Bush said, “That’s
what I do, I’ll make the decision.” “Well, sir,” Saul said, “then I would
say launch.” The President kicked everyone
out of the Oval Office but Cheney. What do you think, Dick? “This is the best
intelligence we’ve had yet on where Saddam’s located,” Cheney replied. “If we
get him, it may save a lot of lives and shorten the war. And even if we
don’t, we’re going to rattle his cage pretty seriously, and maybe disrupt the
chain of command. That’s well worth the effort in and of itself.” Now he was
unequivocal. “I think we ought to go for it.” The others came back in.
Finally, at 7:12 P.M., the
president said, “Let’s go.” It was three minutes before Franks’s
deadline. Powell noted silently
that things didn’t really get decided until the president had met with Cheney
alone. Myers went to the secure
phone to inform Franks. Woodward cultivates so many sources who
reveal comprehensive information to him, that as a result, he can present detailed
accounts of meetings that encourage readers to turn page after page absorbed
in unfolding events. Plan of
Attack presents a rare inside perspective that’s makes for interesting
reading. Steve
Hopkins, May 25, 2004 |
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ă 2004 Hopkins and Company, LLC The recommendation rating for
this book appeared in the June 2004
issue of Executive Times URL for this review: http://www.hopkinsandcompany.com/Books/Plan
of Attack.htm For Reprint Permission,
Contact: Hopkins & Company, LLC • E-mail: books@hopkinsandcompany.com |
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